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Abstract
This paper presents a model of cumulative innovation where …rms are heterogeneous
in their research ability. We study the optimal reward policy when the quality of the
ideas and their subsequent development e¤ort are private information. The optimal
assignment of property rights must counterbalance the incentives of current and future
innovators. The resulting mechanism resembles a menu of patents that, contrary to the
existing literature, have in…nite duration and …xed scope, where the latter increases
in the value of the idea. Finally, we provide a way to implement this patent menu by
using a simple buyout scheme: The innovator commits at the outset to a price ceiling
at which he will sell his rights to a future inventor. By paying a larger fee, a higher
price ceiling is obtained. Any subsequent innovator must pay this price and purchase
its own buyout fee contract.
¤Address for correspondence: Gerard Llobet, Department of Economics, Harkness Hall, University of
Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627. We thank Fernando Alvarez for helpful comments.
yUniversity of Rochester
zUniversidad Torcuato Di Tella and University of Rochester
xUniversity of Minnesota
12 Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts
1 Introduction
A central feature of innovative activity is that research is cumulative. This is relevant
to the way in which research is rewarded. If research is rewarded through the granting of
particular property rights, as for instance in a patent, the cumulative structure leads to the
natural question of what to do when the next improvement arises. How can the property
rights of the previous state-of-the-art be compatible with rewarding the recent improvement
with its own property rights?
A variety of methods are available to reward innovators. Two of the most commonly
discussed (in Wright (1983), for instance) are patents and research prizes. The latter is
simply a transfer to the innovator for development of a particular invention. The former
consists of the granting of some sort of market power to the innovator, perhaps in exchange
for a fee. It is well understood that, when information is complete, it is optimal to choose
a prize as the reward, since it does not result in any of the distortions that may accompany
market power. When the principal charged with rewarding innovators does not have complete
information about the bene…ts of an invention, however, it has been shown, for instance in
Scotchmer (1999), that it may be optimal to grant a patent, since the value of the reward is
then tied to the innovation’s value through its potential pro…ts in the market.
In this paper we study the optimal mechanism to reward innovations when new ideas
arrive continually, and there is both moral hazard and adverse selection. We allow the patent
o¢ce a variety of instruments, but force them to operate with limited information about the
potentially patentable innovations. The optimal reward, it turns out, has a relatively simple
form: it is a patent, with no statutory expiration date, but rather providing a constant
amount of protection against future improvements forever. Under very plausible conditions,
the optimal patent policy involves di¤erent types of protection for di¤erent innovations.
We show that the optimal mechanism can be instituted through a system of mandatory
buyout fees. This mechanism generates information which reduces the burden on courtsRewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts 3
of determining infringement. The menu of contracts o¤ered by the patent o¢ce in order
to implement the optimal reward is not time or history dependent, which is particularly
appealing in terms of realistically using such a method.
When the value of an innovation is known, so that there is adverse selection but no moral
hazard, the problem of competing property rights in a cumulative innovation setting may
never arise. In that case, even if costs are unknown, it may be possible to provide incentive
entirely through a simple cash prize. Although not the focus of her paper, this is true in
the single innovation model used by Scotchmer (1999). We show that, in a slightly di¤erent
model, a mechanism similar to the one used to regulate a monopolist with unknown cost
(Baron and Myerson (1982)) can support the e¢cient choice of research without any patent
rights being granted. In both Scotchmer (1999) and the model here, the optimal reward for
an innovator with unknown costs is identical to the optimal regulation of a monopolist with
unknown costs.
When value is known, then, the problem is not compounded by cumulative innovation,
since the reward is paid in full immediately, and is therefore not relevant when the next
improvement arrives. Scotchmer (1999) and Cornelli and Schankerman (1999), however,
point to the usefulness of patents when the value of an innovation is unknown, resulting
in a moral hazard problem. If the quality of the innovation is unobserved, the regulator
cannot o¤er a reward which depends on quality. Therefore the regulator uses a patent. The
monopolist pays a greater fee for a greater time period of patent protection.
When the model is extended to include multiple innovations, however, the optimal policy
can change considerably. When value is unknown, so that patents are employed, the problem
of competing property rights arises. A promise of patent rights to one innovator might
be in con‡ict with o¤ering another patent to a future innovator, and might discourage
future innovators, as in O’Donoghue, et al. (1998). Lines of what constitutes a “su¢cient”
improvement to warrant a new patent must be drawn.
We characterize the optimal reward system in a cumulative innovation context with in-4 Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts
complete innovation on the part of the patent o¢ce. Like Scotchmer (1999), the patent o¢ce
o¤ers “better” patent protection in exchange for a higher fee. Here that protection means
that a greater percentage of possible future innovations are precluded by the innovator’s
patent. As in other work such as O’Donoghue, et al. (1998) this ability of a patent to pre-
clude future innovations is labeled the patent’s “breadth.” We use an extreme model where,
if only one innovator is ever to arrive, the optimal patent policy implements the e¢cient
level of research. We then show that in the same model, but with multiple innovators arriv-
ing in sequence with cumulative innovations, it is impossible to achieve the e¢cient level of
research. This reinforces the idea that the cumulative nature of innovation is very relevant
to policy.
By using a mechanism design approach, the problem of enforcement of patent breadth,
a contentious one in practice, is studied alongside the optimal breadth itself. The optimal
policy introduced here generates information about the quality of innovations. That is, all
that the government must determine in order to dole out property rights is if an innovation is
related, in the sense of being on the same “ladder,” as the previous innovation. We require of
the policy that it generates enough information to solve problems of “infringement” through
the self-selection from a menu of patents. This is in contrast to current policy, where the
courts must determine more than just if two innovations are quality improvements over the
other, but also how much of an improvement has been made. In the mechanism studied
here, infringement is determined by the reports of the innovators, lowering the burden on
the patent system.1
An interesting feature of the optimal policy is that each patent o¤ered consists of a given
breadth, maintained forever. That is, the patent expires only when something better than
the constant threshold comes along; the optimal policy does not prescribe that the amount
of protection increase or decrease over time. Current patent policy has a clear sense in which
level of protection declines suddenly, at the end of the patent’s statutory life. The optimal
1See Llobet (1999) for a study on how the legal environment a¤ects cumulative research.Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts 5
policy here suggests that patents should end only because something better arrives, and not
because of some imposition of a statutory time limit for the protection.
We alsoshowthat, under plausible conditions, the menu o¤ers avariety of patent breadths
to di¤erent innovators, depending on their costs and the resulting quality of their innovations.
Bigger improvements get greater protection. Interestingly, it has been claimed that, in
fact, the patent courts do provide additional protection for products which represent large
improvements. This result also shows that it may be optimal to provide for a variety of
breadths, which the current US statute does not explicitly allow for.
Given that the optimal policy calls for a variety of patent breadths, it might seem that
implementing the optimal policy would require a very complicated system. To the contrary,
we show that the optimal mechanism can be implemented through mandatory buyout prices.
Innovators, as part of the granting of a patent, must commit to a price at which they will
relinquish their rights. This commitment mitigates any bargaining power a patent holder
might exert on future innovators. Tandon (1982) uses similar buyout fees in a complete
information model to mitigate monopoly costs. Here we add the fact that, by o¤ering a
menu of buyout fees to innovators, the fees can be useful in generating information about
the innovators. The fee acts as the breadth of the patent: the bigger the fee, the greater
the patent’s implied breadth, since future innovators will need a substantial improvement to
justify the larger buyout fee.
The set of patents, then, o¤ered under the buyout agreement is a menu of buyout fees,
accompanied with prices paid to the government. In order to take the lead, an innovator
must pay the prearranged buyout amount to the prior innovator, choose its own buyout fee,
and make the appropriate payment to the government as prescribed by the menu. The menu
of contracts o¤ered by the government has a simple, stationary form. The government has a
constant set of posted prices for patents with various buyout amounts, and innovators choose
their favorite whenever they want to take the market lead.
Other authors have studied the trade-o¤ between patents and prizes. Notably, Wright6 Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts
(1983) argues that prizes may mitigate problems associated with patent races. In our for-
mulation, with ideas private to a single innovator, this argument for prizes is not present.
Shavell and van Ypersele (1998) suggest o¤ering an optional reward, so that some patents
would be replaced with rewards. They do not consider the possibility that this might lead to
adverse selection when the quality of innovations is unobservable and endogenous. In single
innovation formulations such as Scotchmer (1999), it is true that the optimal reward is a
prize if the value is known. The single innovation case with asymmetric information and
general reward mechanisms is considered in Chiesa and Denicolo (1999), with similar results.
Previous models of optimal patent policy have for the most part not considered cumula-
tive research. Exceptions include Scotchmer and Green (1990), Green and Scotchmer (1995),
and O’Donoghue, et al. (1998). The model employed in the latter is most similar to the
one here; a central di¤erence is that in their model the patent o¢ce is fully informed and
therefore could o¤er a prize to reward innovators. We consider a case where research is cu-
mulative and the patent o¢ce’s information is incomplete, and show that it di¤ers from the
optimal mechanism in the one innovation case, in the sense that it departs from the logic of
the regulation literature. On the other hand, they consider heterogeneity on the part of the
consumers as well as a form of bargaining between innovators. They consider both in…nite
length, …nite breadth patents and in…nite breadth, …nite length patents. We consider the set
of all possible breadths and lengths (in the sense that length can be thought of as breadth
reduced to zero after a certain time), and …nd that in…nitely lived patents are optimal.
The next section sets the stage by studying a version of the model where there will only
ever be one innovator. When costs are unknown but value of the project is observable, the
reward for an innovator is a cash prize. When value is unobservable, patents are employed
as a reward. In the model below, the e¢cient level can be implemented in either case. These
results mirror the results of several papers in the patent literature and are similar to the
spirit of mechanisms used in the regulation literature. The main points come in the third
section. There, the general model of many innovations is introduced and the optimal policyRewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts 7
is contrasted with the one for the single innovator. The patent agency must concern itself
with how to provide a reward for one innovator without discouraging future innovators.
2 A Single Innovation
In order to set the stage for the model with cumulative innovations, it is useful to start
by addressing how the mechanism designer reacts to a single innovator in isolation. There is
a single good di¤erentiated by quality q and an in…nite horizon of discrete time periods. A
product of quality zero is sold competitively at marginal cost, normalized to zero. There is
a single, in…nitely lived consumer with time-additively separable preferences and per period
utility q ¡ p, where p is the price of the good. These preferences are standard as in, for
instance, Anderson, et al. (1992), and can be justi…ed by adding a composite good and
quasilinear utility. The future is discounted at according to a discount factor ±.
This section sets the stage for the cumulative case by studying a single innovator. Con-
sider a single …rm arising with an idea, which can be turned into an improved product if
research is undertaken. Suppose that …rms are indexed by their capabilities to undertake
research through a parameter z. We assume z is drawn from a known distribution ©(z) with
density Á(z). A higher z means that the …rm can obtain improvements at a lower cost.2 The
cost of the improvement is a function not only of z but also of the size ¢ of the improvement
(in the quality space) over the state of the art, in this case q = 0, according to c(¢;z): It
is assumed that c1 > 0, c2 < 0, c11 > 0 and c12 < 0: The …rst assumption says that bigger
improvements are more costly. The second says that the higher is the …rm’s z, the lower are
its costs. Costs are convex. The last assumption is important: the higher is z, the lower are
2Alternative interpretations of z could be: quality of the idea that the …rm obtains, experience obtained
by marketing similar products, scale economies, know-how, etc.
Any of these interpretations makes natural to assume that inventions cannot be bought and put in the
public domain, because this kind of knowledge is non-transferable.8 Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts
marginal costs c1. Therefore the social planner prefers that …rms which draw high z spend
more on research. The higher is z, the more e¢cient is the …rm at research.
We will, at various points, consider two market structures. The …rst is simply competi-
tion, where p = 0 is the result of marginal cost pricing. In that case, consumers receive ¢
units of surplus per period. On the other hand, if the innovator is given a monopoly right,
the product is sold for p = ¢, the consumers are left with no surplus, and the …rm makes ¢
units of pro…ts per period.
Suppose that there is a government regulator which can observe q for each good, but
cannot tell what the costs of innovation for the good were. That is, z 2 R+ is private
information to the innovator. The question is, what can the regulator do to encourage
innovation in this case?
The size of the innovation ¢ is also the amount of social surplus it generates each period.
If the product is sold competitively at marginal cost 0, then the homogeneous consumer
enjoys ¢ units of surplus. If the product is sold at a higher price, pro…ts rise one-for-one
with lost consumer surplus. The First Best allocation that a fully informed social planner







The implicit function theorem can be applied to show that @¢¤
@z = ¡c12
c11 > 0. In general, not
all ideas will generate an increase in welfare that justi…es the cost. There will be a threshold






The patent o¢ce can reward the innovator with a fee F(z) (which may be negative,
a prize), or with a patent lasting T(z) periods. A …rm with improvement ¢ sells it for
price p = ¢ during the patent term. As in Baron and Myerson’s (1982) monopoly regulation
problem, it is su¢cient here for the government to encourage innovators to choose the e¢cientRewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts 9
level of spending through a transfer program, which might be referred to as a prize system.
Denote ¢(z) the improvement requested for a type-z …rm.3 Here, the fees will be negative
(prizes), but in future sections they may not be. Let R(T) =
PT
i=1±
i¡1. The patent o¢ce’s










z = argmax^ z R(T(^ z))¢(^ z) ¡ F(^ z) ¡ c(¢(^ z);z) for all z,
R(T(z))¢(z) ¡ F(z) ¡ c(¢(z);z) ¸ 0 for all z.
The …rst constraint, incentive compatibility, ensures that each …rm truthfully reveals its
type z. The second, individual rationality, guarantees that each agent prefers the reward to
remaining anonymous. The following depicts the optimal prize system F(z) which support
the optimal level of research. Let z¤ denote the smallest project to be implemented, i.e. the
one such that ¢¤(z) = 0 for all z < z.
Proposition 1 When ¢ is observed, the socially optimal level of research, i.e. ¢(z) = ¢¤(z)
and z = z¤, is achieved with T(z) = 0 and
F(z) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 z < z¤





@i c1(¢¤(i);i)di z > z¤
The nature of the optimal mechanism is identical to the one Baron and Myerson (1982)
use to regulate a monopolist with an unknown cost. For any given z, the regulator knows
the e¢cient ¢¤: For the lowest type, the prize o¤ered exactly o¤sets research costs, F(z¤) =
¡c(¢¤(z¤);z¤): For a higher type z, which has lower marginal cost, it o¤ers a larger prize in
return for more innovation. This looks attractive to a low marginal cost …rm, but not so to
a high marginal cost …rm.
3Implicitly, the reward agency is o¤ering punishments to …rms which report z but develop ¢ 6= ¢(z).10 Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts
Since our formulation disregards the static costs of monopoly, it would also be possible
for the government to support the …rst best with patents of varying lengths, increasing in ¢.
We focus here on the pure-transfer system because it minimizes monopoly power (there is
none; innovations are bought for F(z)). We have also disregarded the possibility that funds
are costly for the government to obtain. If both funds were costly and monopoly generated
static markup distortions, it is reasonable to think the latter would be more important, and
therefore the government would choose the prize method rather than granting monopoly
power to the innovators. In fact, if the government has access to a consumption tax, it
can always raise funds with the distortion which generates pro…ts for the monopolist. It is
not hard to imagine that the government can raise funds at least as e¢ciently as with a
consumption tax; in that case the optimal choice is to use the prize scheme when possible.
In reality, the true quality of an innovation is hard to ascertain, and therefore a prize
system may be di¢cult to implement e¤ectively. As a result, Scotchmer (1999) shows that
it may be useful to o¤er patents, since the value of a patent is tied to the value of the
innovation. The solution is similar to the one employed by Lewis and Sappington (1988a,
1988b). There, when regulating a monopolist, the planner o¤ers to allow a higher price in
exchange for payment of a fee. Only a monopolist with high demand will …nd it worthwhile
to pay the fee. A patent works like the price: a longer patent is valuable the greater is
quality (demand).
Consider the model presented above, but where ¢ is unobservable. As a result, the
regulator faces an additional constraint due to moral hazard:
¢(z) = argmax
^ ¢
R(T)^ ¢ ¡ c(^ ¢;z) ¡ F(z).
Because the monopolist can extract all the surplus from the consumers, the e¢cient outcome
can be attained, but only through the granting of monopoly power.
Proposition 2 When ¢ is unobserved, the socially optimal level of research, i.e. ¢(z) =
¢¤(z), is only achieved with T(z) = 1.Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts 11
Because of the inelastic demand, even unknown ¢ may not prevent the government from
implementing the e¢cient level of innovation. However, that result can only be attained
through the granting of patent rights, as opposed to the earlier case with known ¢, which
could be implemented entirely with cash payments. This is the important point of this
section. In the next section, we take up the main point of the paper: what happens when
innovation is cumulative. When patents are essential (i.e. when ¢ is unobserved), there
will come the question of how to weigh the property rights of one innovator with that of the
next. One of the important di¤erences in the next section is that the optimal policy will be
di¤erent and will be unable to attain the e¢cient level of research.
3 Multiple Innovations
Suppose that each period a new …rm arrives with a new idea z, allowing an improvement
over the current quality in the amount ¢ with cost c(¢;z) as before. If ¢ is observable,
the government could simply employ the prize system of the last section in sequence to each
innovator. The conclusions of that section would remain unaltered. As such, we focus our
attention on the case where ¢ is unobserved, so that there is both moral hazard and adverse
selection. The optimal patent for a single innovator involved a patent. O¤ering a patent,
however, is quite di¤erent when innovation is cumulative, as pointed out, for instance, in
Scotchmer and Green (1990) and O’Donoghue, et al. (1998). The optimal patent for the
sequential case must take into account the fact that property rights granted to the …rst
innovator might preclude some future improvements. The patent, in order to be economically
meaningful, may have to preclude small improvements, else the original innovator’s ability
to pro…t from research may be short lived.
Given that property rights might change as innovations arrive, a patent will be de…ned
by its “breadth” z0
t(z). That is, a …rm reporting that it is of type z receives sole rights
until a report of z0
t(z) is made by another innovator t periods after the patent is issued. For12 Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts
instance, the current US statute can be thought of as calling for a common breadth until
the patent reaches a statutory time limit, at which point breadth is reduced to zero, and so
any improvement is allowed to be produced.4
The set of possible instruments we allow, then, is very large.5 Fortunately, we …nd a rel-
atively simple characterization of the optimal mechanism. From the innovator’s perspective,















The innovator’s expected revenue from sales of the product are ¢ ¤ d, the product of ¢,
the per period pro…ts of producing the innovation, and d, the expected duration. This
formulation assumes that when a new innovation arrives, older ones may still be produced;
in equilibrium of the pricing game they are not sold in positive amounts, though, although
they do have the e¤ect of limiting pro…ts to the incremental quality ¢ rather than the entire
quality of the produced good. This assumption is not material; all of the results remain
unchanged if a patent allows the holder to dominate the entire industry with no fear of
competition. The model is formulated as it is, though, to capture the idea that although
legally still a patented product and …t for sale, the e¤ective life comes to an end because
something else comes along and makes the innovation e¤ectively obsolete.6
We have two problems to solve. The …rst is, given d, how should breadth z0
t(z) be
assigned? Once that is resolved, it remains to be decided how to allocate duration for
di¤erent types z. This mirrors the problem above: in the one innovation case, it is optimal
to provide full protection, i.e. duration of
P1
i=0±
i. With multiple innovations there is the
4Of course, the other element is that after the end of the patent’s statutory life, imitators may enter.
Imitators are ignored here, though, since there are no static costs of monopoly in this model
5It turns out that the value function we derive for the patentor is concave; therefore, it is without loss of
generality that we do not explicitly consider the possibility of randomization over rewards.
6In O’Donoghue, et al. (1998), the consumer side is set up so that the two best products are sold in
positive quantities, thereby making the obsolescence gradual.Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts 13
additional trade-o¤ that larger duration means excluding more future ideas.
It turns out that it is never optimal to o¤er changing breadth over time, and therefore
we will look at in…nitely lived patents of constant breadth z0(z).
Proposition 3 Given a duration d, it is optimal to grant a constant breadth, in…nitely lived
patent z0(z).
In addition to making the analysis substantially simpler, this result points to an important
intuition about optimal property rights for repeated innovators. Take, for instance, the
example of a …xed breadth z for T periods followed by zero breadth after that, which could
be thought of as current US policy. If a longer patent is o¤ered, less breadth needs be
o¤ered in each period. The extra protection being extended through a longer time is given
for the smallest z, whereas the breadth it reduces comes, at the margin, from large z near
z. The patentee cares only about the cumulative probability of being a leader, but the
patentor cares about the size of the next innovation which is allowed. Therefore, this switch
from protection against high z now to lower z later can improve social welfare, while at the
same time maintaining the expected pro…ts to the innovator. This force pushing for longer,
lower breadth patents in the cumulative context is not an artifact of any particular modeling
assumption, but rather a natural result of the di¤erent aims of patentor and patentee. This
complements the result in Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) which suggests that, in terms of static
cost of monopoly, long lived patents may be best.
Although we consider breadth in terms of the quality of the idea z, it is equivalent to
think of breadth in terms of the size of the idea required for a noninfringing innovation. As
we will show next, there is a strictly increasing relationship between the size of the invention
achieved, ¢, and the parameter z. Breadth, then, can be thought of in the usual sense:
a higher z0 means that it will take a larger improvement for a subsequent product to be
produced.
In order to …gure out the optimal z0(z), and hence the optimal duration, …rst an inno-14 Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts
vator’s response, in terms of innovation, to a given breadth z0 must be calculated. A given
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where ¢p denotes the optimal choice made by the …rm. Due to the assumptions on the















The more breadth is granted, the more innovation will be undertaken, since it is likely to
pay o¤ for a longer e¤ective patent life. Of course, the cost is that breadth precludes future
innovations that might be worthwhile.





If anything less than an in…nite breadth patent is granted, innovation will not be at the
e¢cient level. But precluding future innovations will not, in general, be optimal; patents
will be weakened to allow for subsequent innovations at the cost of ine¢cient levels of research
for each innovation.
The principal can observe neither the quality of the invention nor the research e¢ciency
of the …rm. The condition for truthful revelation given the two instruments, z0 and F, is forRewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts 15
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The following theorem characterizes implementable choices.
Proposition 4 (Guesnerie and La¤ont, 1984) A piecewise C1 decision function z0 is
implementable only if @2W
@z0@z
@z0
@z ¸ 0 whenever z0 is di¤erentiable at z.
For the lowest type z which is undertaken, pro…ts are minimized to zero, i.e. W(z;z0(z)) =
0; and every other type z receives positive pro…ts as a result. The expression for F(z;z) is















1¡±©(z(b zi)) > 0 it must be that F is strictly increasing in z, so that better
inventors obtain more protection at a higher price.
The mechanism designer, then, must choose a protection level z0(z) for any level z that
might arise. Fortunately, the problem has a relatively simple recursive structure. The
dynamic problem of the principal is


















0(z) increasing16 Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts
The state of the economy is the leading edge quality q and the promised breadth z: The …rst
term re‡ects the fact that, if an idea comes along less than z (which happens with probability
©(z)), consumer plus producer surplus equals q, since no improvement can be allowed to
arrive, and the state is unchanged. If an idea of type greater than z arrives, though, the
patent authority can o¤er a new patent with breadth z0. That encourages the innovator to
generate an invention of size ¢p(z;z0), leaving the leading edge quality at q +¢p(z;z0). The
formulation assumes that funds are costlessly obtainable by the government; it is completely
straightforward to add a cost ¹ of acquiring funds, as in La¤ont and Tirole (1986). None of
the results presented are adversely e¤ected by the inclusion of such a cost.
A natural question is whether the optimal contract involves a uniform patent or if the
principal will be interested in separating di¤erent …rms with di¤erent capabilities. The
answer is that the optimal patent contract calls for greater breadth for higher z if o¤ering
more breadth has a greater e¤ect on research for innovators with better ideas, i.e. @2¢p
@z0@z > 0.7
Proposition 5 If @2¢p
@z0@z > 0; the optimal mechanism satis…es z0(z) strictly increasing in z.
The intuition here is straightforward. The cost of higher breadth in terms of lost future
projects does not depend on z, but the marginal bene…t is increasing if @2¢p
@z0@z > 0, since it
has more of an e¤ect on incentives to innovate.
There is some evidence that courts follow something like this rule. The most common
way to invalidate a patent is to show the courts that it is not a very “big” improvement. In
such cases, the patent may be invalidated (i.e. zero breadth), or it may be that it is quite
easy for other products to be produced. Allison and Lemley (1998) study a sample of 299
patents litigated in 239 cases. These represent all the suits in the period 1989-1996 started
by competitors in order to invalidate existing patents. They …nd that the most argued reason
to limit the original innovator’s property right is the obviousness of the patented invention,
7This condition of ¢p amounts to a condition on a third order cross derivative of c. An example of a
simple function satisfying this assumption follows.Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts 17
used in 42% of the cases. In this model, this idea is captured by the size of the innovation, ¢.
When z0(z) is strictly increasing in z, small improvements get less protection, while larger
inventions get more. This additional protection, is, of course, costly. The proof of the prior
proposition, together with the …rst order condition, implies that @V
@z0(q + ¢(z;z0);z0) < 0, so
promises of breadth by the patent o¢ce decrease future prospects.
One might imagine what cost function might satisfy the assumption made on ¢p. The
following demonstrates one.
Example 1 Consider the cost function c(¢;z) = ¢®



























































Finally, when ¢ is not observable, less inventions will be implemented and they will have
a smaller value.
Proposition 6 The optimal mechanism when ¢ is not observable has ¢p(z) · ¢¤(z) and
z0(z) > z¤ for all z.18 Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts
This illustrates the cost of the patent o¢ce’s lack of knowledge of ¢ in the cumulative
research context. Another way to show the cost of the incomplete information is to de…ne















We de…ne g¤ and gp as the growth rates when actions are observable (the optimum) and
hidden (where some projects are precluded) respectively. It is immediate from Proposition
6 that the growth rate will be lower when there is private information.
Corollary 7 For all z, g¤ = g¤(z) and g¤ > gp(z). Moreover, g¤ > gp.
The fact that we can compare the two kinds of economies allow us to study which is the
value of information in this model. Such an estimation can be related to whether we want
the patent system to be just a registration mechanism or an exhaustive way to review and
study innovations.
4 Decentralization through Buyouts
When patent breadth is studied in situations with complete information, there is no
discussion about how to enforce the resulting optimal policy. Implicitly, it is assumed that
the courts can be used to implement the appropriate breadth. In practice, though, the
de…nition of breadth in the patent statute tends to be vague. Given that vast resources are
spent in patent litigation, it seems that enforcement is not at all trivial. The mechanism
design approach implicitly considers enforcement, since it induces agents to truthfully reportRewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts 19
z and choose the associated ¢(z). That is, an advantage of the proposal o¤ered above is
that the mechanism itself generates information about the quality of the innovations. If
two products are on the same ladder, the report of the type z is su¢cient to determine
infringement and future protection. A system like the one in place in the United States
requires the courts to determine precise infringement; that is, the courts must determine
what qualities have arisen.
So far we have been using three instruments f¢;z;Fg to reward innovators. We now
consider di¤erent mechanisms to achieve the same allocations, one which has straightforward
real-world analogues. This is important because an important message is that multiple patent
breadths might be optimal. In implementing these breadths, we will focus on buyout fees. A
…rm with the invention ¢ has to pay an amount ¿ to purchase the previous innovation and
with it the right to produce. At the same time, purchasing a patent from the government
with a price ¾0 the …rm guarantees that anybody in the future wishing to produce will have
to buy his invention for an amount ¿0. We next focus on whether a buyout mechanism of
this sort can implement the same kind of allocations as the original one.
The protection for an innovator comes from buyout fees f¿0(z);¾0(z)g: Notice that the
menu of contracts available to the innovator to protect his innovation does not depend on
the type of patent in place, but only the report of z. That is, the optimal contract is simply
a set of guaranteed buyout fees ¿0(z) o¤ered at a …xed set of prices ¾0(z). Anyone wishing
to sell a product must simply pay the existing fee ¿ to the current market leader, choose
a contract, and pay ¾0 to the government. Only the payo¤ to the prior innovator depends
on the past. The set of contracts is not history dependent, which makes them particularly
simple to implement, but potentially restrictive in what they can implement. We show that
the optimal patent menu from the prior section can, in fact, be implemented with these
simple sort of fees.
Denote the minimum entrant under those fees by z¿(z). A …rm with capability z facing20 Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts






1 ¡ ±©(z¿(b z))
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1 ¡ ©(z¿(b z))
1 ¡ ±©(z¿(b z))
±¿
0(b z) ¡ c(¢
p;z) ¡ ¿ ¡ ¾
0
The …rst term re‡ects discounted expected pro…ts from sales. The second is discounted
expected receipt of the buyout fee ¿0. Pro…ts, then, are net of costs c and fees ¿ to the
prior innovator and ¾0 to the government. Given z¿(b z), notice that ¿, ¾, and ¿0 do not
a¤ect the decision of which ¢p to choose. Therefore, this mechanism will induce the same
level of invention if z¿(z) is equivalent to the z0(z) obtained using the other mechanism. The
following results show that a buyout-based contract can implement the mechanism described
in the prior section.
Lemma 8 The buyout-based contract f¿0(z);¾0(z)g is implementable and independent of ¿
if
1. ¿0(z) is non-decreasing in z, and

























Proposition 9 Any incentive compatible contract fz0(z);F(z)g can be achieved using a
buyout-based contract f¿0(z);¾0(z)g. That is, for all z z0(z) = z0
¿(z). Moreover, ¿0(z) is
non-decreasing in z.
The implication of this is that contracts can be simply o¤ered, at a price ¾, by the
government, which state that the holder of the contract has exclusive rights to produce on
that ladder until such time as another innovator pays ¿ and a new price ¾0. Better ideas
(higher z) receive more protection through a higher buyout fee ¿: they are protected more
by the fact that the next innovation will have to pay more in order to produce.Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts 21
5 Summary
The patent statue involves a single, somewhat vague de…nition of breadth for all innova-
tions, and leaves most of the job of deciding property rights to the courts. In constructing
rewards for innovators, however, it is possible to generate information through the self se-
lection of patent protection. In fact, we show here how patent breadth can be implemented
through a system of buyout fees, replacing much of the burden now placed on the courts.
This is especially important if one wishes to o¤er di¤ering patent breadth to di¤erent inven-
tions. It is not surprising that in light of the heterogeneity of inventions, the optimal reward
policy may reward di¤erent innovations with di¤erent breadth.
In this paper, the optimal policy is characterized, and it is found that in many cases such
di¤erentiation is optimal. This is an important practical point: it may be both optimal as
well as feasible to o¤er multiple patent breadths. In addition, the optimal policy has patents
of in…nite statutory duration. The sort of patent policy described here would involve a more
complicated set of patents o¤ered, but a less complicated system to determine infringement,
since the choice of patent would determine who had a right to produce.
A feature of the optimal policy is that patents have in…nite statutory duration. They
expire, e¤ectively, only when something suitably better comes along. This results because it
is always better to transfer pro…ts to the leader in a state of the world when some amount
of time has passed, but nothing good enough to supplant it has come along, rather than by
giving extra breadth precluding a useful innovation. Whereas the patentee cares only about
the probability of being the leader, the patentor cares about the size of the innovation when
the new leader comes along.
This is important because it di¤ers from the lessons of the one innovation case, which
has been studied in slightly di¤erent environments. The cumulative research formulation
used here suggests, as in other papers such as O’Donoghue et al (1998), that breadth is a
central part of the de…nition of a patent when further innovations will arrive. It may be more22 Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts
di¢cult to achieve e¢cient research outcomes in the cumulative case. The optimal policy
might require di¤erentiation between innovations through breadth in the cumulative case.
The results also suggest an intuition regarding the question of the optimal length of
patent protection. While this is a classic subject dating back to Nordhaus (1969) and Arrow
(1969), among others, the formulation used here provides a new way to look at the role
of statutory length when patents may become obsolete before the end of the statutory life
of the patent. Long lived patents are bene…cial in the sense that they shift the patent’s
enforcement to relatively low value projects, rather than precluding higher value projects for
a smaller length of time.
Here, an infringing improvement is never able to be produced by way of some licensing
agreement. This assumption is made to highlight the role of patents in dissuading future
innovators. For the patent problem to be interesting, of course, licensing must be imperfect,
lest the Coase theorem lead to an e¢cient outcome. It is possible to imagine that a buyout
scheme such as the one suggested here might facilitate transactions of patents, since the
protection they provide would be more clearly delineated than under the current patent law,
where the outcome is left entirely to the court’s discretion. It is clear that any policy which
encourages licensing would have that as an extra bene…t.
Important questions remain. An important issue is that of strategic behavior by in-
vestors. Here each innovator in the sequence is di¤erent. This may overlook the fact that
patentees routinely are thinking about future innovations that they will patent themselves
when making research and patenting decisions. Another central question is the role of li-
censing. Incorporating some form of imperfect licensing would add an important element
of the role of patents. All of these issues can be addressed within the structure introduced
here, taking account of both the cumulative nature of research as well as the asymmetry of
information that makes the rewarding of innovation a di¢cult task of government.Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts 23
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6 Proofs
Proof to Proposition 1:









which is satis…ed for ^ z = z, since T 0 = @¢¤
@z c1(¢¤(^ z); ^ z). Integrating and solving in the pro…t
function for F we obtain the desired result.
Proof to Proposition 2:
Proof. Because ¢ is not observable and this is a function of z, F only depends on z.





so, a necessary condition to achieve the …rst best is R(T) = 1
1¡±, or T = 1. That is su¢cient
is an obvious consequence from the lack of monopoly distortion.
Proof to Proposition 3
Proof. Consider all the sequences fz1;z2;:::g that result in a duration d. De…ne dt for
t = 1;:::;1 as dt = 1 + ±©(zt)dt+1.where d = d1.
Denote S as the social welfare from implementing an idea z, increasing in z. Hence, the
value of o¤ering a duration d solves,









and can be written recursively for any t as,




S(z)Á(z)dz + ±©(zt)V (dt+1)
s.t. dt = 1 + ±©(zt)dt+1.26 Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts
Let’s start considering one period deviations. Suppose that from period t+1, we choose
a plan with a constant z that we will call z¤, and we want to …nd which is the optimal zt.







since in every period we provide the same protection. Of course, we need to set z¤ to solve
dt+1 = 1
1¡±©(z¤) so that the previous commitment is satis…ed. Replacing the expression for
V ¤ into V we obtain,








































Replacing, the FOC becomes
Á(zt)[S (z
¤) ¡ S(zt)],
Obviously, this FOC is zero if and only if zt = z¤. Trivially, if zt > z¤, the condition is
negative, and if zt < z¤ the opposite is true. Because this is the unique …xed point of V ,
zt = z¤ is the maximizer of V .
To show that multiple deviations do not improve upon a constant zt we do it in two
steps. In the …rst step, suppose that there is a sequence with a …nite number of deviations
that achieves a bigger V that a constant z. Take the one that deviates for less periods,Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts 27
b t, fz1;z2;:::zb t;b z;b z;b z:::g from a constant z that lead to a higher value V . Take period b t.
Because one period deviations are not pro…table, we can construct another sequence that
deviates b t ¡ 1 periods and achieves a bigger value V , leading to a contradiction.
In the second step, suppose that an in…nite number of deviations achieves a strictly bigger
value V . By continuity, there must be a sequence with a …nite number of deviations that
also achieves a bigger value, and this is not possible from the previous step. Therefore, given





Proof to Proposition 5:
Proof. For our result is enough to show that V is strictly supermodular in z and z0. In














0) = 0. (5)
with respect to z is strictly positive. Since @V












































Therefore, the derivative will be strictly positive if and only if @2¢p
@z0@z > 0. Function
V is a contraction mapping. Hence, usual dynamic programming arguments ensure that
this function is weakly supermodular. The proof of strict supermodularity is obtained by
contradiction.28 Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents and Buyouts
Proof to Proposition 6:
Proof. That ¢p(z;¢) · ¢¤(z) is obvious from the remarks in the text. For the second
part, we take a recursive argument. Assuming that z0 ¸ z¤ we show that z > z¤.











±[V (q + ¢
p(z;z
0);z
0) ¡ V (q;z)]g.








p(z;x);x) + ±V (q;x),
and together with the fact that @V
@q = 1













If ¢p(z;¢) < ¢¤(z), the FOC implies that @V
@z < 0 and,
¢p(z;z)









Because z¤ is characterized by
¢¤(z¤)
1¡± ¡ c(¢¤(z¤);z¤) = 0, and this is an increasing function,
z > z¤.
If ¢p(z;¢) = ¢¤(z), it must be that z = 1 > z¤
Proof to Lemma 8:
Proof. Suppose that the following innovations are implementable. Using the Revelation
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Pro…ts for any inventor are independent of q and so, using the Implicit Function Theorem























And this immediately implies using the previous result, that in order for a mechanism to
be implementable, @¿0
@z ¸ 0.








and by the de…nition of W¿(z0
¿;¿;0) = 0, this means that W ¿(z0
¿;¿0;¿) = ¡¿. Integrating
with respect to z and using this boundary condition we obtain the expression for ¾0(z) which
does not depend on ¿.
Proof to Proposition 9:
Proof. Two contracts fz0(z);F(z)g and f¿0(z);¾0(z)g will be equivalent if they guarantee
the same pro…ts to innovators of all types z.
























Hence, for both contracts to be equivalent it must be that W(z;z) = W ¿(z;¿0;¿), which
results in
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for all z. It can be veri…ed, using convexity of c with respect to z, that this function is
increasing in z. This result implies that there is an implementable buyout scheme that leads
to the same pro…ts than any implementable contract fz0(z);F(z)g.